EquipmentShare: Relentless Self-Dealing, a Tech Veneer, and the Missouri “Cult” That Started It All

Published on June 24, 2026

Source: YouTube

Summary

• Missouri-based EquipmentShare (“EQPT”; “the Company”) describes itself as “a vertically integrated platform that combines proprietary technology, a connected equipment fleet, and a nationwide footprint to serve the construction industry.” In plain terms, EQPT rents heavy equipment such as forklifts and excavators.
• EQPT came public on January 23, 2026, months after its largest outside shareholder, Romulus Capital, sued the Company. Romulus alleged EQPT ousted its board representative to “muzzle” his efforts to “reveal ongoing fraud” by founders Jabbok and Willy Schlacks.
• We became interested in EQPT after learning former insiders echoed Romulus’ claims. A post we read early in our work captures the essence: “A common mantra in the operations side of HQ is that [EQPT] exists to make the Schlacks’ other companies (that they own entirely) profitable.”
• Our investigation – spanning interviews with formers and industry experts, plus a review of litigation, property records, and UCC filings – independently corroborates and expands well beyond these allegations. We found undisclosed related-party transactions that have netted Schlacks-affiliated entities at least $77 million, with the true figure potentially running substantially higher.
• Our findings might interest pre-IPO holders, including Romulus (~56 million shares). These holders own 168 million shares – 71x the 30-day average daily volume and 5x the current float – which become free trading when EQPT’s 180-day IPO lock-up expires on July 21.
• Since 2023, 88% of EQPT’s fleet expansion has come from its OWN Program (“OWN”). Branded an “innovative capital-light fleet growth model”, OWN is effectively a sale-leaseback arrangement: EQPT sells equipment to third parties – high-net-worth individuals (“HNWs”), family offices, and institutions – manages and operates the assets and shares a portion of the resulting rental revenue.
• Our report unveils EQPT’s HNW and family-office channel built around three undisclosed entities – EZ Equipment Zone (“EZ”), Bevel Financial (“Bevel”), and Armada Fleet Management (“Armada”). We believe a key reason OWN exists is to enrich the Schlacks, with interviews and corporate filings indicating they own and manage Bevel and Armada.
  • At 59% of its Original Equipment Cost (“OEC”) as of September 30, 2025, the HNW/family office channel represents the largest source of fleet for OWN.
• EZ was founded by two brothers, Dwight and Brent McMinn. It has less than 10 employees and is based at the McMinn’s embroidery shop in Patton, Missouri – a town of ~1,000 people. Yet a January 2026 EZ info pack touted $2.8 billion of fleet enrolled in OWN – 55% of its assets. How did two brothers with no finance or fleet management experience become the dominant resellers for OWN?
• EZ’s unlikely ascent traces to a personal connection between the McMinns and the Schlacks: Ben Brubacher – Bevel’s co-founder, an early EQPT employee, and the man who helped them “escape” Shepherdsfield – the Missouri “cult” where they were raised.
  • Deep ties we unearth appear to have led EZ to make Bevel its preferred financing solutions provider. OWN’s growth exploded after the Schlacks formed Bevel alongside Brubacher.
• Our analysis reveals, from 2021-2025 $24 million in undisclosed loan origination fees were collected by Bevel from EZ alone.
  • Bevel is not disclosed as a related party, yet corporate filings and UCC records list the Schlacks as directors, officers, and borrowers.
  • Likewise, EZ is not mentioned in investor materials, despite sharing identical branding, slogans, and fleet details as EQPT. Rental peers and a former employee call EZ “an extension of EquipmentShare.”
  • A 2019 website archive shows EZ’s disclosure of its partnership with EQPT, before it was scrubbed – reportedly on orders from EQPT’s General Counsel and the Schlacks’ “cousin”. EZ now refers generally to EQPT as a “national equipment rental company” obscuring the relationship.
• In late 2024, EQPT began sourcing fleet through Armada – another undisclosed related party. It shares a registered agent and attorney with numerous Schlacks entities, and former employees suggest it is “wholly owned by the Schlacks.”
  • Armada has almost no online presence, but we learned key details from a March 27, 2026 webinar led by Dr. Josh Cochran, a dentist turned wealth coach focused on “financial freedom” and “passive income.”
  • We also had our investigator meet directly with Armada’s representative, which confirmed many of the details revealed in the webinar.
• “Coach Dr. Josh” hosted Armada’s affiliate – Brian Duncan – who simultaneously serves as Bevel’s Head of Underwriting. In the webinar, Duncan shared Armada will “buy [its] tranches of assets, anywhere from $20 million to $100 million at a time”, including a $100-$200 million allocation in June 2026.
  • This strikes us as a blatant contradiction of EQPT’s IPO narrative that transactions with Schlacks-controlled entities are winding down. Oddly, in Q1 2026 EQPT reported no equipment sales to these entities – did they fail to disclose material related-party revenue?
  • Duncan also disclosed a 3% “fleet aggregation fee” which matches EZ’s disclosed cut. This disclosure implies Armada has captured an estimated $18 million in fees since Q4 2024.
• Beyond enabling the Schlacks’ self-dealing, we believe these entities sit off-balance sheet because they rely on grey-area marketing which we doubt would survive SEC and IRS scrutiny.
  • A former EQPT insider called EZ’s “EZGrowth” offering “Ponzi-adjacent.” This investment program used an SEC exemption that prohibits “general solicitation”, which we believe EZ’s marketing may violate.
  • A primary pitch to OWN investors is accelerated depreciation that can offset active income. However, its passive nature appears inherently at odds with IRS “material participation” rules to claim these deductions.
  • OWN partners convey that “material participation” can be achieved, “typically through 100 hours per year and more time than any individual.” Per IRS Temporary Treasury Regulation 1.469-5T, this means logging at least 100 hours of “regular, continuous, and substantial involvement” with the asset, which we suspect OWN investors illegitimately meet.
    • In the webinar, Cochran educates participants on potential ways to hit 100 hours: check EQPT’s tracking app, visit branches, and send emails. He claims, “this is not a loophole; this is actually like literally following what they want you to do” yet cautions participants, they “can discuss it with the IRS and pay the 6% penalties” if ever audited.
• Our concerns extend beyond OWN. We found a web of 130 Schlacks-affiliated entities, including 91 that share addresses with the Schlacks’ family office, The Premiere Group (“Premiere”). We believe these entities have further enabled their rampant self dealing.
• We analyzed county property records for 306 EQPT locations. They show that across 49 properties Premiere has owned it made at least ~$35 million from buying and flipping sites them at steep mark-ups.
  • The $35 million is based on 20 of 32 transactions that county’s provide price data for, with 17 additional EQPT properties still held by Premiere.
  • In at least two cases, EQPT seems to have transferred property to Premiere for no consideration, including a California site it had purchased for nearly $4.7 million roughly a year earlier.
  • A former employee told us they had serious concerns about these deals, adding “several of my counterparts in the accounting team did as well.”
• In a particularly puzzling transaction for an equipment rental company, EQPT absorbed “Resla” (fka Premiere Luxury Rentals LLC), the Schlacks’ Tesla rental company. Corporate filings show Resla was formed in 2022 under Premiere with Jabbok Schlacks as “Manager.”
  • A former insider told us plainly: “That was a Schlacks moonshot. Because it failed, EquipmentShare bought it” and “I can tell you it wasn’t to benefit EquipmentShare because, like anything else, EquipmentShare is there to benefit the Schlacks.”
• We believe these activities have gone unchecked as the Schlacks are surrounded by “yes men.” Several key EQPT insiders were members of the Shepherdsfield “cult” – which formers told us are “effectively family.” Self-dealing in the “inner circle” is “generally well known, but not spoken about, because that’s the culture,” per a former employee.
• We found extensive evidence of retaliation against those who pushed back – litigation, dismissals, exit NDAs – and several employees who allegedly quit over the conduct.
  • A former senior employee shared, “If you get too much information, if you’re not in the inner circle, you are usually then seen by someone from John Griffin’s office at some point to be shown the door.” They added that “certain last names have provenance that leads back to the Schlacks or the commune”.
• EQPT jammed through four pre-IPO ABS deals in a year totaling nearly $2 billion. Management touts these as evidence of strong institutional demand. We read them as EQPT conceding economics to keep OWN palatable to public investors. Our research indicates institutions require higher yields and tighter structural protections than the early enrollees who signed on for tax benefits.
• Our findings lead us to believe the HNW/family office channel is unsustainable, forcing EQPT to either ramp ABS deals on worsening terms or buy fleet outright. We expect this to result in some combination of higher CapEx, greater leverage, and lower margins.
• The strain may already show. At EQPT’s midpoint guidance, OWN payouts will grow nearly double Adjusted Core EBITDA, and returns to OWN investors will reach 15%, up from 12% in 2024.
  • “Adjusted Core EBITDA” adds back OWN Program payouts – real costs we have shown are rising – and includes $221 million of Equipment Sales segment EBITDA at the midpoint.
  • OWN payouts were $714 million in 2025, larger than the Company’s entire EBITDA before adjustments.
• We believe EQPT has weak yields, high leverage, and no free cash flow after maintenance CapEx. Combined with the governance and disclosure red flags our report reveals, EQPT should trade at a discount – not a premium – to peers, implying substantial downside.

Source: Reddit

Initial Disclosure: As of the publication date of this report, Umibōzu Research (whether directly or through the Umibōzu Affiliates) holds a short position in the securities of, or derivatives linked to, EquipmentShare.com Inc. (Nasdaq: EQPT), and therefore stands to realize material gains or losses as the price of such securities changes. Umibōzu and the Umibōzu Affiliates may buy, sell, cover, or otherwise transact in such securities at any time – before, at, or after publication – and may be long, short, or neutral at any point, regardless of the views expressed in this report. All positions are subject to risk management and may be reduced, closed, or otherwise modified at any time following publication; such activity may occur immediately after release, for any reason, and is not a reflection of any lack of conviction in the opinions or facts set out in this report. A full disclaimer appears at https://umibozuresearch.com/disclaimer/

Origins: The “AirBnB of Construction Equipment”

EquipmentShare (“EQPT”; “the Company”) is an equipment solutions provider which came public on January 23, 2026. The Company was founded in 2014 by brothers Jabbok and Willy Schlacks, who serve as CEO and President, respectively, and retain 81% of the voting power at EQPT.

EQPT initially sought to be the “AirBnB of construction equipment” – a peer-to-peer marketplace enabling contractors to increase equipment utilization, while offering up to 40% lower rates than incumbent rental companies.

Source: Wayback

Ultimately, contractor-to-contractor rentals proved less successful than other peer sharing ideas. Yard Club, a competing startup, was acquired by Caterpillar for its software assets, while other platforms like Dozr entered receivership.

Former employees told us the concept “just doesn’t work.” They said EQPT’s early platform supply came from the founders’ “contractor buddies”, who inevitably found themselves needing the equipment out on rent. EQPT’s pivot was described as out of “the necessity of trying to figure something else out” and the opening of the Company’s first rental yard was “when things finally took off.”

Today EQPT is the fourth largest player in the construction rental industry, managing a fleet of 262,650 units – ~$9.1B in total Original Equipment Cost (“OEC”). It has two primary businesses: Equipment Rental and Services Operations (62% of FY25 revenue) and Equipment Sales (35%). These segments cover renting and selling equipment to contractors from 407 operational locations across 45 states, along with revenue from telematics, parts, supplies, and maintenance services.

Bull Case: Differentiated T3 Technology Drives Organic Demand Fulfilled Through the OWN Program, an “Innovative Capital-Light Fleet Growth Model”

The vast majority of EQPT’s revenue comes from conventional rental activities, but it attributes its scale to a differentiated “three-part flywheel” of technology, organic expansion, and capital-light fleet growth.

Source: SEC Filings

T3 is EQPT’s cloud-based fleet management platform, integrated across its entire fleet. It gives contractors real-time visibility into equipment location, utilization, and maintenance, and is OEM agnostic – which EQPT argues creates switching costs. T3 generated $66 million of revenue in 2025 (1.5% of total revenue).

Source: Investor Presentation

EQPT says T3 is “forward deployed” into markets it doesn’t yet serve, with customers then “demanding EquipmentShare start in that market.” Unlike rental peers that grow through acquisitions or speculative branch openings, EQPT claims it is pulled into new markets by software-driven demand, with 75% of new-site revenue from existing customers.

Source: Investor Presentation

Rounding out the flywheel is the OWN Program. OWN follows a sale-leaseback model: investors buy equipment from EQPT, then immediately enroll it into the rental fleet. EQPT manages the asset, rents it to end customers, and shares the revenue. The Company insists OWN delivers “lifetime cash flows substantially similar to balance sheet equipment” with reduced upfront investment.

Source: Investor Presentation

Since 2023, EQPT’s OEC has grown 130%, with OWN driving 88% of that expansion. As of March 31, 2026, OWN represented 56% of EQPT’s fleet – ~$5.1 billion of OEC – and is projected to reach up to 60% by year-end.

Source: SEC Filings

OWN comes with the added benefit of delivering upfront equipment sales as the program grows. It drove approximately $1.5 billion of Equipment Sales segment revenue in 2024 and $1.3 billion in 2025. In 2024 alone, sales into the program grew 187%.

Source: SEC Filings

In May 2026, EQPT raised full-year guidance across the board, targeting 427-435 full-service locations by year-end and reporting 55% trailing twelve-month mature-location EBITDA margins.

Shepherdsfield – the “Cult” Where it All Began

Before delving into our core findings, it is essential to highlight the Schlacks’ formative years at Shepherdsfield, a religious commune formed in 1979 by ~70 people who splintered from a San Diego church and followed their pastors to a sheep farm in Fulton, Missouri.

Source: Angels and Demons Podcast

Former members themselves refer to Shepherdsfield as a “cult”, including one who detailed “escaping” in a blog called Cult Girl Speaks Out. The blog reflected on the “misplaced idealism” and “spiritual abuse” at the commune and how rigid law “created an environment of façades.”

Source: Cult Girl Speaks Out

Members made a “lifetime commitment”, surrendering all personal possessions. They had no personal banking, received only a monthly “pittance”, and contributed all earnings to a common treasury. “Elders” made it “taboo” to visit family members outside the community and “shunned” the departed, sending them out with virtually nothing.

The commune was supported by various companies, notably Shepherd’s Co. – a self-described “family-owned business” offering construction, painting, window cleaning, and other services to “over 2,000 commercial accounts.”

Source: Shepherds Company

Missouri state records show Jabbok Schlacks became a Partner at Shepherd’s Co. in 1995 at just 18. He and Willy appear to have led the business, listed as its contacts for government and state bids across the country.

Source: Shepherd’s Company Application for Fictitious Name – Jan 11, 2010

These ventures sustained Shepherdsfield before a significant exodus occurred around 2010. Former members says its leadership “went way off”, leaving many – especially younger generations – disillusioned. When members left, families were forced to “cut off” their departed children, driving a wider exodus. Missouri filings show just nine remaining partners as of 2015.

Shepherdsfield’s decline coincided with a Missouri Department of Labor investigation into Shepherd’s Co. for prevailing wage law complaints that allegedly helped it outbid union competitors. The company fought requests to turn over its financial records for about a year, suing the State for failing to provide due process. Jabbok Schlacks specifically worried documents “could be used, possibly, for something they’re not intended for.”

The investigation ended in 2011 in a non-monetary settlement, with Shepherd’s Co. reportedly agreeing to become a subchapter S corporation and improve its bookkeeping.

Source: Columbia Tribune

Following this investigation, the Schlacks appear to have “escaped” Shepherdsfield – with the help of another key character we will introduce later on. Yet, their loyalty to departed members has remained strong, with EQPT serving as a hub for them over the years.

We were told members were “effectively family”, which we believe the Schlacks leveraged to weed out dissidents.

“It took time to realize certain last names have provenance that leads back to the Schlacks or the commune. It was very much a whisper culture like, oh, this individual said this offhand comment, which would then denote non-loyalty to the Schlacks or questioning of the approach or whatever, which would then quickly see that person offboarded.”

The Schlacks’ wives have been employed. Jeffrey Lowe was a co-founder; his brother, Andrew Lowe, has served as VP of Fleet and Market Expansion. Others like Anthony Morgan – who is on the real estate team – and Timothy Welker – Director of Operations – joined later, with several more in lower-ranking positions.

Schlacks family from outside the commune also hold key positions. Their “cousin”, John Griffin, has been VP and General Counsel since inception. Daughters and family friends have all been hired as well.

Source: Social Media, Public Filings

A former employee elaborated on the ties to Shepherdsfield:

“There are certain last names that were pretty prevalent at EquipmentShare of employees. I couldn’t tell you exactly if they were commune adjacent, but we knew that they were Schlack adjacent. It’s like, oh, that’s somebody’s so-so cousin or they married in the family on this one.”

Unlike immediate family relationships, which must be disclosed, SEC rules do not capture the conflicts inherent in this “cult” dynamic. We believe this gap has enabled the Schlacks’ self-dealing.

Part 1: EquipmentShare’s Growth Story is Built on Quicksand; Hidden Distribution Channels Include Undisclosed Related Parties Potentially Representing Material Revenue

Numerous Former Insiders Have Blown the Whistle on Self-Dealing at EquipmentShare

In October 2025, EQPT’s largest outside shareholder – Romulus Capital – filed a sworn complaint in the Texas Business Court alleging that the Schlacks are “engaged in self-interested transactions across the numerous entities that they or other family members own or control” and that “several vendors and businesses with which [EQPT] conducts business are indirectly owned and controlled by the Schlackses, but these relationships have not been disclosed.”

A former EQPT employee – who has since been sued by the Company – posted on an Reddit thread (“EquipmentShare Fraud?”), and was similarly direct, calling the C-suite’s conduct “unethical, immoral, and discriminatory,” while preparing for litigation with “years of screenshots, screen records, audio recordings.”

Reddit users have widely agreed with the allegations in the Romulus complaint, including one who revealed a “common mantra” at EQPT was it exists to make other Schlacks entities which they own more profitable.

Source: Reddit

We build on these allegations with primary-source evidence, including corporate filings, UCC records, property deeds, and interviews with formers and industry peers.

As we will show, we believe the OWN Program began as a vehicle for the Schlacks self-dealing and scaled through an opaque ecosystem, including undisclosed related parties. We have uncovered three connected entities the Schlacks have relied upon to extract exorbitant fees: Bevel Financial (“Bevel”), EZ Equipment Zone (“EZ”), and Armada Fleet Management (“Armada”).

OWN Began as a Vehicle for the Schlacks Personal Deals & Now is Sold as an “Innovative Capital-Light Fleet Growth Model”

Before EQPT came public the Schlacks were heavily involved in OWN. In 2022, entities they controlled held 23% of total OWN OEC and collected 30% of all payouts. At peak in 2024, those entities purchased $277 million of equipment through the program – 17% of total Equipment Sales – while collecting $74 million in revenue-share payouts.

We spoke with a former employee who described OWN as initially serving as an “added benefit” to EQPT’s early investors.

“It started out as a program that EquipmentShare investors that were on the initial cap table would utilize as just an added benefit back in 2020, 2021. Later expanded to employees, and then only more recently did it become a broader investment option as they saw its growing success.”

We were told the Schlacks’ assets in the program were given preferential treatment.

“That was a contention in one of the lawsuits. I can say, yes, I agree. If I was that investor, I probably would feel the same way. I think that equipment owned in the OWN Program by the Schlacks is getting fixed at no charge when they are charging the other people repairs on their equipment. I think that’s just an oddity. Their company inside, the OWN Program is not treated the same as the other investors in the OWN Program.”

This was echoed by another former employee who explained that terms of these deals were “closely guarded”.

“It is my assumption that the founders were getting much more substantial favorable terms, but those terms were closely guarded.”

Further, they said the expectation internally was never for OWN to scale beyond the IPO.

“The OWN Program was just a necessity to fuel growth and have that revolving line of capital prior to going public. They didn’t think it was going to be something that would sustain afterwards. Also, they didn’t think it was going to sustain once they hit pure maturity in the number of locations in North America either.”

We believe OWN’s growth was unexpected and largely driven by favorable tax policy. As we will show, the Schlacks capitalized on this demand, constructing a web of undisclosed entities that have pushed what we consider loopholes, while originating the financing for their investments as well.

Multiple former employees confirmed this ecosystem was set up to extract fees:

“They’re creating this ecosystem, this constellation of related service companies who are targeted at OWN Program participants, and therefore, capturing slice after slice of money, revenue, whatever you want to call it, from these guys and sending that back to the company founders.”

We learned the Schlacks thought the program could have a “stigma” and were reluctant to tout its growth. We suspect this was due to both their personal participation, as well as the groups and tactics used to solicit investors.

“Again, that was still 2023, 2024, where they were still unsure if there was going to be a stigma about the OWN Program. At some point, a switch flipped because, for the most part, they did keep it low key prior to going public because I assumed they didn’t know how it would be received by public investors. At some point, the switch flipped and said, oh, we should tout this program. [REDACTED] and I were under the sincere impression in 2023 that the entire OWN Program would be spun down when the company went public.”

We believe EQPT scrambled to create a more institutional sourcing story that would be palatable with public investors. In late 2024 it completed the first of four asset-backed securities (ABS) deals launched in the run-up to the IPO. It also reduced the Schlacks on-paper involvement in OWN. Founder OWN OEC has fallen from 23% of the program to approximately 3%; Q1 2026 disclosed OWN payouts to the Schlacks were just $0.3 million.

Source: SEC Filings

But the institutional pivot carries a cost. We believe early OWN participants tolerated lower returns for tax benefits, while institutional investors will demand higher yields and structural protections. We believe ABS transactions require EQPT to maintain a borrowing base coverage ratio of 83-84% of the outstanding note balance at all times, undergo monthly appraisals, and maintain minimum debt service coverage ratios. Automatic liquidation events risk being triggered if any of those tests are failed. Deteriorating economics are potentially already visible in rising payout yields.

Source: SEC Filings

As of September 2025 – the last disclosure of OWN’s channel mix – 55% of OWN OEC and 30% of the total fleet remains sourced from HNWs and family-office investors. Thus, we believe there is significant room for economics to deteriorate further if EQPT shifts to institutional capital to sustain its growth.

The Undisclosed Trinity: How EZ, Bevel, and Armada Extracted Exorbitant Fees from the OWN Program

A Miracle in Missouri: Introduction to The Unlikely Entity Sourcing Billions of Fleet for EquipmentShare

EZ Equipment Zone is an obscure company based in Patton, Missouri – a town of ~1,000 people – that describes itself as “one of the largest known pools of heavy rental equipment in the United States.”

EZ is led by two brothers, Dwight McMinn and Brent McMinn. It lists just nine employees on LinkedIn and appears to operate from the same address as their family’s embroidery machine business, Stitch-It International.

Source: Facebook, Google Directory

The McMinns have run various family businesses but lack relevant finance or fleet management experience to indicate they are qualified to source and manage nearly $3 billion of equipment.

Dwight appears to have no formal education but has had an entrepreneurial career. A “self-proclaimed muscle car junkie”, in 2004 he started Mowear Motorsports, a pre-owned auto dealer that now specializes in restomod builds.

Source: Facebook

Meanwhile, Brent, is a former contractor who has run embroidery services and supplies businesses since the early 2000s. At the end of 2025, EZ hosted a retirement luncheon for Brent who seems to have been shifting his attention to producing a film about human trafficking, passing his businesses to his sons.

Source: YouTube

Despite this background, EZ’s materials indicate it is the dominant fleet aggregator for OWN. As of January 1, 2026, it promotes that “more than 41,000 pieces of equipment, representing $2.8B in assets were enrolled in the EZ Equipment Zone Platform”, with assets growing as much as 41% in 2025 per the implied change from its own previous disclosure.

Source: EZ Equipment Zone

Based on EQPT’s disclosed fleet as of March 31, 2026, this implies EZ represents 50-55% of OWN.

Source: SEC Filings, EZ Info Pack

We Estimate Bevel – EZ’s Preferred Financing Solutions Provider – Has Collected At Least $24 Million in Fees from EZ Assets Alone

We believe Bevel has been the key enabler of EZ’s growth, and therefore OWN. To support investors, EZ promotes, “between 80-90% of the [equipment] purchase price may be financed, and financing is available through our financial institution partnerships or third-party lenders.”

Bevel is clearly shown on EZ’s website as its preferred financing solutions partner.

Source: EZ Equipment Website

It describes itself as “a one-stop shop for comprehensive financial solutions across diverse sectors”, including general equipment, commercial real estate, business acquisition, and aviation.

Source: Bevel Financial Homepage

The firm has 11 employees per LinkedIn, and at the start of 2025 it celebrated crossing $1 billion in total funded volume. However, since 2023, Bevel has highlighted a testimonial from EQPT, claiming it financed $3 billion of equipment for the Company – a disclosure which does not square with this $1 billion milestone from over a year later.

Source: Bevel Testimonials

Equipment rental businesses commonly offer financing for customers; however, we find it suspect that the Schlacks established Bevel uniquely as an off-balance sheet entity. The Romulus complaint explains this structure, alleging the Schlacks conceal their ownership of Bevel through immediate family members.

Source: Romulus Capital Complaint

Corporate filings show Bevel was incorporated in Delaware in May 2021, during the exact period OWN began to explode. A registration for a Missouri subsidiary in August 2022 lists Jabbok Schlacks as Bevel’s President and William Schlacks as Director, alongside Ben Brubacher as Secretary and Director.

Source: Missouri Creation of Foreign Business- Aug 26, 2022

Brubacher was previously listed on Bevel’s website as its “Advisor & Co-Founder” noting his “12 years of business development experience” and that he was “an early employee at EquipmentShare”.

Source: Bevel Archived Website

Archives show that two of the other four members of Bevel’s founding team came from EQPT and continued to work there while at Bevel.

Source: LinkedIn

Finally, UCC filings also show Jabbok Schlacks signing as an officer for Bevel in December 2022. He is listed as the “borrower”, with heavy equipment exhibited as Bevel’s collateral, presumably enrolled in OWN.

Source: Missouri UCC- Bevel

A former employee confirmed the relationship to us, suggesting that Bevel was set up to extract fees from OWN:

“There’s a number of businesses that they own, Bevel is just one of them, that are preferred vendors of Equipment Share. It allows them to bundle core services and expenses to their own privately owned businesses.”

“It’s worth noting that almost all of those entities are Schlacks-invested entities. The company that underwrites the insurance, Bevel, who helps produce the financing, they mostly distributed that to arm’s length parties and institutions. Most of that can just be funneled through those different preferred providers, and they can then capture that same revenue in just different ways.”

A March 2026 investor webinar revealed that Bevel collects a 1.25% origination fee on the transactions it finances.

Source: Armada Webinar Transcript

A former Bevel employee told us fees for arranging financing can rise as high as 3%.

“That fee, that goes to the broker, depending on how many mouths there are to feed, anywhere from 25 bps to sometimes 3%. It just totally depends on if there’s a program involved, if there’s a co-arranger or whatever is involved.”

Based on EZ’s disclosed assets alone, we estimate Bevel has collected at least $24 million through origination fees. In this base case scenario, we assume 90% of this OEC was purchased on credit, with Bevel originating 75% of those loans at a 1.25% average fee.

EZ & Bevel Are Linked by a Former EquipmentShare Employee We Were Told “Helped [the Schlacks] Escape” from Shepherdsfield

Bevel and EZ are linked by Ben Brubacher – mentioned above as Bevel’s former CEO and an early EQPT employee.

Former employees identify Brubacher as the brainchild for Bevel, explaining he was given license to operate the entity despite clear signs his lack equipment finance experience caused it to underperform. We were told that the Schlacks had immense loyalty to Brubacher for rescuing them from Shepherdsfield.

“He helped them escape in the middle of the night. When I say escape, that’s Jabbok’s word. They escaped in the middle of the night, and he took them in until they could get their feet underneath them… Even though Ben wasn’t doing as good of a job and was inexperienced and unknowledgeable, nothing could supersede that loyalty that was there with Ben. He would mitigate his risk by pulling certain things out of Ben’s world… but Ben still got compensated the same way, even though he wasn’t doing all the work at that point in time. They used it as a platform to, basically, pay Ben back. There is nothing that would change that level of loyalty for the Schlacks brothers.”

They explained this loyalty led EQPT to make several other strategic missteps.

“There are some backstories as to why Ben was the one running it, things with the Schlacks brothers, their personal relationship with Ben, and the loyalty that they had to Ben associated with it. This is one of those cases where I think they let their personal loyalties get in the way of business, unfortunately. Ben also convinced them to buy a bank, which was the most ridiculous thing I’ve ever heard in my entire life…”

A former employee insisted that EQPT would have been more profitable if Bevel was captive:

“It could have been run so much better than how we were running it… It’s just he could have maximized that profit more if they kept it as a captive.”

Another explanation for the Schlacks loyalty to Brubacher may be the key role he played in establishing Bevel as EZ’s preferred financing solutions provider. Brubacher is connected to the McMinns at EZ through Brian Davis, a part-time pastor and previous co-founder of a Brubacher venture. More notably, two of Davis’ children, Brianna and Luke Davis, are married to two of Dwight McMinn’s children, Truett and Treasure. The Davis family is also deeply involved in the operations of both Bevel and EZ. Brian’s wife, Amy Davis – now a Sales Manager at EZ – was an early senior employee at Bevel, listing that she began working there in August 2020. His son, Andrew Davis, has worked at EZ as an accountant since 2023.

Source: Amy Davis, Andrew Davis

While we have more evidence of Brubacher’s ties to the McMinn’s through Davis, it is clear he also has maintained a direct relationship with them. Brubacher and his wife’s shared Facebook account shows several McMinns including the wives of Brent and Dwight interacting with a Brubacher family picture posted in 2024.

Source: Facebook

In 2022, the shared Brubacher account posted a video of a performance at their venue, Sawyer’s Landing, where Dwight and his wife Julie McMinn can be seen.

Source: Facebook

We note that while Brubacher was historically the central figure at Bevel linking EQPT and EZ, he appears to have stepped away from the business around mid-2024.

Exhaustive Evidence Supports Former Employees and Industry Peers’ Characterization of EZ as an “Extension of EquipmentShare”

When it comes to EZ, we have the same question we had with Bevel. Why isn’t it captive? EZ’s utility to the Schlacks is less obvious. In theory, Bevel could originate loans for EQPT’s equipment directly, and the Schlacks could collect those fees without a reseller involved.

We see a variety of explanations for the arrangement, including but not limited to serving as another extraction channel – potentially via kickbacks –, shifting regulatory liability, or simply supporting the Schlacks old friend, Brubacher. While these are just our theories, what is clear is EZ seems to exist exclusively to support OWN. Not only has EQPT neglected to disclose this relationship but it appears to have actively attempted to hide it.

EZ itself has said that it’s primary offering, “Advantage Flex”, was developed “in partnership with EquipmentShare.”

Source:EZ Info Packs

A 2019 archive of EZ’s website explicitly states investors’ equipment is “made available for rent through our strategic rental agreement with EquipmentShare.com.”

Source: EZ Equipment Website Archive

We were told by a former employee that EQPT’s General Counsel, John Griffin specifically advised the Company to remove this disclosure.

“It was on their website early on. I remember when [REDACTED] told them that they had to take it off because Griffin told them they had to take it off for some reason.”

EZ claims to have been founded in 2016, yet corporate records show that its Missouri entity was formed on April 5, 2018, the same day the “ezequipmentzone.com” domain was registered. EQPT created the OWN Program around this same time. In December 2022, Kyle McMinn – Brent McMinn’s son who now lists being an owner of EZ – specifically described EQPT as a “business I’ve been involved with for 7 years”, implying the relationship with EQPT began shortly after it was founded.

Source: Facebook

Marketing materials for EZ’s offerings prominently display EQPT’s name and branding. The EZ website also links to EQPT’s “T3 Tracking Login”, displays images of the T3 platform, and has consistently disclosed location count that tracks with the growth of EQPT’s footprint. The two companies even share the same slogan: “A Better Way to Rent” (see here and here).

Souce: EZ Equipment, EquipmentShare

A former employee we spoke to labeled EZ a “true extension of EquipmentShare”, noting the “long history there at a personal level”:

“I don’t know exactly what the founder’s relationship to the EZ guys was, but I do know that there is a pretty long history there at a personal level. From a functional perspective, you’re exactly correct. EZ’ fleet is an extension of EquipmentShare’s. Those assets live at EquipmentShare yards. They are a true extension of EquipmentShare.”

In 2019, Ahern Rentals – now part of United Rentals – sued EQPT for RICO, trade secret misappropriation, and systematic poaching, naming EZ as a defendant alongside them and calling it “merely an extension of EquipmentShare’s equipment rental operations.” EZ was dismissed from lawsuit as Ahern failed to demonstrate its involvement in the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets, but Ahern’s characterization of EZ was not rebutted.

Armada – a New Undisclosed Related Party – Describes Buying Hundreds of Millions of Dollars of Fleet from EquipmentShare

In the past couple years, EQPT began marketing OWN through a new entity: Armada Fleet Management (“Armada”).

A former EQPT insider we interviewed suggested the Schlacks own Armada:

“Armada is incubated underneath the Premier Property Group. It is not owned or operated by EquipmentShare. It is its own third-party entity wholly owned by the Schlacks.”

Armada Fleet Management LLC was incorporated in Missouri on September 20, 2024, by Andrew J. Williams. In 2025, two additional entities – Armada Fleet Management II LLC and Armada Fleet Group LLC – were formed by Scott H. Malin.

Source: Missouri Corporate Filings

Both Williams and Malin have organized numerous Schlacks-affiliated entities in Missouri. Based on these filings and our conversations with formers, we believe the Schlacks are the beneficial owners of Armada, making it an undisclosed related party.

Like EZ, Armada also seems to have effectively no operational presence. Its website is a single landing page with a contact form and a meeting calendar. It does not appear to have employees that list working directly at the firm on LinkedIn.

Source: Armada Website:

Despite its low profile and being formed less than two years ago, Armada claims to be a significant force in OWN.

Some of the limited information we could find on Armada came from Cochran Capital, described as a “platform designed to help others achieve financial freedom and secure their future through real estate investment and other alternatives.” The group is run by Dr. Josh Cochran – a former dentist turned real estate fund manager who distributes the program through this firm and more recently a site called OwnAFleet.com.

Cochran appears to have a close relationship with EQPT. He has been pictured visiting an EQPT branch and enjoying tasty burgers with Brian Duncan, an Armada affiliate who simultaneously serves as Bevel’s Head of Underwriting. Duncan also represented Armada in an individual investor meeting our investigator took to learn more about the program.

Source: Webinar

On March 27, 2026, Cochran led a live webinar that was promoted to a public group of physicians, doctors, dentists, nurses, pharmacists, etc. on LinkedIn

Source: LinkedIn

Cochran’s marketing materials explicitly state: “Armada, through its partnerships with EquipmentShare and Bevel Financial ensures you get top-notch equipment and financing solutions.”

Source: Cochran Capital Wayback

In the webinar, Brian Duncan described Armada’s relationship with EQPT directly:

“Armada Fleet Management, we possess a master revenue share, remarketing agreement, and limited loss agreements with that of EquipmentShare… EquipmentShare has no interest in working directly with individual purchasers of assets, they want to work with a fleet aggregator like ourselves.”

Duncan describes actively purchasing tranches of assets from EQPT, “anywhere from $20 million to $100 million at a time.” He walked through the mechanics clearly: Armada buys the equipment and then resells specific tranches to individual OWN participants, reassigning the rights.

Source: Webinar

Cochran separately described Armada being allocated “$100 to $200 million of equipment for EquipmentShare” in June 2026 alone.

Source: Webinar

These figures are significant considering EQPT recognized $179 million in revenue and $26 million in Adjusted EBITDA for its Equipment Sales segment in Q1 2026. Even if Armada purchased just $20 million in Q1 2026 – the low-end of the tranches it says it buys – this would imply ~11% of Equipment Sales were undisclosed related-party revenue.

It is clear that Armada has collected exorbitant fees from the arrangement. The Cochran webinar revealed it takes 3% on each transaction it sources for OWN – which matches EZ’s take rate. For transactions financed with debt, Bevel takes another 1.25%, resulting in fees of 4.25% per transaction flowing to Schlacks-affiliated entities.

Source: Webinar

Based on these economics and the above figures, we estimate Armada has generated at least $18 million in fees. For simplicity, we have assumed a steady $60 million allocation per quarter. We believe this is conservative given Armada claims demand for more than $400 million of fleet at the end of both 2024 and 2025 and expects to buy $100-200 million in June.

Source: Webinar, Original Analysis

Just like EZ – Armada Appears an Extension of EquipmentShare

We called Armada’s HQ and were given the option to speak with Bevel or Equipment Finance Services (“EFS”), an EQPT subsidiary. The directory provided no option to speak with anyone from Armada.

Source: Armada Website

Source: Google Search

Armada’s website navigation includes a direct link to EQPT’s T3 platform. The site also links to Bevel’s website under “Finance Equipment Purchase.” The contact address is the same registered agent address as other Schlacks entities. The disclaimer explicitly references the OWN Program.

Source: Armada Website

Overall, we fail to reconcile this fact pattern with the IPO narrative that EQPT has been winding down founder participation in OWN. Given the $100-200 million allocation Armada guided to get in June, we are skeptical of EQPT’s Q1 2026 disclosure that there were no equipment sales to entities owned or controlled by the founders during the period.

Source: Q1 26 10-Q

Aggressive Solicitations & Questionable Tax Benefits: OWN’s Growth Rests on Marketing That May Invite Regulatory Scrutiny from the SEC & IRS

Source: Umibōzu Meme Department

EZ as 1-2-3: “Unrealistic” Returns & Securities-Esque Offerings

We believe another reason EZ and Armada may have been set up outside EQPT’s corporate perimeter was to distance the Company from marketing these resellers used to fill OWN – tactics that carry legal and regulatory exposure it may want to keep off its books.

Both channels sell two main promises: leveraged passive income, and equipment depreciation that shelters active income from tax.

EZ markets its rental product as the “Advantage Flex” Program, emphasizing monthly cash flow, tax efficiency, and favorable loan terms. The promised return varies greatly depending on where you look – Advantage Flex materials advertise a projected net annual return of “14-18%+,” while a January 2026 presentation promises 10-12%. Former employees told us these projections are “really unrealistic,” likely struck on a gross basis before revenue splits, financing costs, fees, and management charges.

Source: January 2026 EZ Info Pack

One former employee told us returns were apparently being “guaranteed” through the programs:

“I ran into one of the investors. He was buying some equipment or something, and he has his own rental company, but he was investing in EquipmentShare in the OWN Program. He said he was guaranteed a 10% return. He said for me to be guaranteed a 10% return; it’s better for me than investing in my own company because I’m not getting a 10% return on some of my own investments inside my own company.”

We came across another example from Travis McMinn, the son of EZ’s founder Brent McMinn, promoting “a minimum 16% annual return on investment with guaranteed rentals.”

Source: Travis McMinn LinkedIn

While Armada doesn’t showcase any of its marketing online directly, we found Cochran Capital pitches the program most aggressively. Cochran illustrates that a $130,000 investment, levered, can offset $1 million in active income immediately while paying 6-9% in passive annual cash flow.

Source: Cochran Capital Website

Cochran has separately promoted an 18% cash-on-cash return on equipment leasing.

Source: LinkedIn Post

We found that EZ offers a second program, “EZGrowth,” that appears to cross from equipment rental into securities – which may be marketed to the general public in a manner incompatible with the federal exemption it claimed. One former EQPT insider described the program as “Ponzi-adjacent.”

“The way EZ Growth works, I’ve looked at it myself as an investor, at the end of the day, it’s not Ponzi… It’s just Ponzi-adjacent.”

On April 28, 2023, weeks after rolling out EZGrowth, EZ filed an SEC Form D claiming an exemption under Rule 506(b) of Regulation D. The filing itself seems contradictory. Rule 506(b) is an exemption from the registration of securities, yet EZ described the “type of securities offered” as an “equipment rental program (non-securities).” Why did they need a security exemption for an offering they said claimed to be non-securities?

Source: SEC Form D

EZ’s own marketing states (1) investors “loan the money” to EZ in exchange for a promissory note; (2) returns are paid monthly as interest income; (3) investors receive a Form 1098 at year-end; and (4) returns run as high as 12% annually. The investor supplies passive capital, while EZ deploys the funds, buys equipment, places it on the rental platform, and pays a fixed, predetermined return set by EZ.

Source: EZ Growth Page

EZ touts the program as “a secure, short-term investment option with high returns” and a “strategic investment program.”

Source: EZ Growth Info-Packet

We are not securities lawyers, however a fixed-return note, marketed for investment and dependent entirely on the issuer’s efforts looks like a security to us. A former employee explained that similar concerns were felt among certain EQPT insiders.

“To be fair, EZ was also the canary in the coal mine for them. Candidly speaking, between me and [REDACTED] and the rest of the folks, we all assumed somebody would get tagged because EZ from early on and to an extent, this was effectively a security. That’s why they are very careful to say, in any other particular case, it’s a tax assumption. It’s assuming it’s active income. It’s assuming these particular aspects. It’s assuming the SEC or any regulatory body will treat it as they’ve presented it”.

Rule 506(b) prohibits issuers from using “general solicitation or advertising to market the securities”, which covers communication that “arouses public interest in a security.”

On September 13, 2023, EZ promoted EZGrowth in a public post on its corporate Facebook page laying out the program’s rates, minimums, and terms, and headlined with an appeal to “Unlock Financial Freedom.” The post was publicly reshared by Kyle McMinn and several other profiles.

Source: Facebook

Source: EZ Growth Wayback

The SEC’s own guidance suggests general solicitation to include “unrestricted public websites”, while “social media or internet posts” can also be included – the precise channels we observe EZ used.

Source: SEC Website

We were told EZ had to remove an earlier offering due to securities concerns raised by lawyers. Overall, we see risks to EZ’s ability to continue to market the EZGrowth program for similar reasons.

“The original incarnation of EZ was a fund. You participated in a fund that went out and bought all the equipment, and then based on your participation in the fund, you got the requisite payouts to that fund. That’s a security. All the lawyers were telling them as such and saying, you’re going to get tagged if you don’t change the way you operate this. That was effectively EZ Fund 1, which has since retired.”

The OWN Program’s Promised Tax Benefits: Only Achievable by Exploiting Loopholes

We have further concerns about EZ and Armada’s marketing related to their use of tax loopholes to source investors.

The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBA) restored 100% first-year bonus depreciation for qualifying equipment placed in service after January 19, 2025, enabling a buyer to write off an asset’s full cost in year one. Cochran’s latest OWN Program partnership – “Own a Fleet” – is clearly built around this policy, marketed to “windfall recipients and high-income earners” under the headline: “Offset your next tax bill with your own managed equipment fleet… fully managed by a major publicly-traded U.S. rental operator.”

Source: OwnAFleet Website

Cochran’s illustrations are significant: for a top-bracket earner in New York or California, they show a $5 million equipment purchase, with $650,000 cash down, producing a claimed first-year tax shelter of ~$2.5 million.

Source: OwnAFleet Website

The IRS built these benefits for active business owners, not passive investors. Under Section 469, passive losses generally offset only passive income – not wages or active earnings – and the IRS applies seven material-participation tests, notably a “100-hour test”, to distinguish the two.

Source: IRS Material Participation Tests

Cochran’s programs call out these hurdles directly. Own a Fleet places each participant’s equipment in a single-member LLC but explicitly tells investors: “This is not a rental business. You are not the operator.” It provides a host of things investors “don’t do”, including finding insurance coverage, performing maintenance, remarketing the equipment at the end of the term, etc. The “one signature” Cochran leaves up to investors is performing the “100 hours of year of involvement to qualify for material participation tax treatment.”

Source: OwnAFleet Presentation

While Cochran suggests investors consult a CPA, he appears to coach attendees on how to achieve the 100-hour requirement. Among various activities which appear illegitimate to us, Cochran claims checking the T3 app for an hour every week can result in 50 hours of “active business participation” a year. He also suggests visiting local EQPT branches and answering emails as additional activities to accumulate required hours. He recommends participants keep an audit trail, and quite literally tells prospects they can argue any potential IRS challenges, pay a 6% penalty, or take the agency to court.

Source: Webinar

We view these tricks as bogus and vulnerable to regulatory scrutiny, calling the entire OWN model into question as its foundation rests upon these marketed tax benefits.

EZ Offers Trips to Cancun & The Opportunity for Investors to “Become Their Own Boss”

EZ’s offerings resemble multi-level marketing. Its social media posts urge followers to tag friends and “build a network of successful entrepreneurs together”, questioning “Are you ready to step into the world of entrepreneurship?”

Source: Facebook

Participants who bring in new investors are rewarded with cash and trips – one referrer publicly described a Cancun trip as a “reward for referring others.”

Source: Facebook

We’re not the only skeptics. In late 2024, a thread on heavyequipmentforums.com questioned the legitimacy of the programs – one member called it “just an MLM scheme,” another said his “scam meter was ticking up.”

Source: Heavy Equipment Forum

Overall, we believe this channel’s growth has come from progressively more questionable marketing – short-term notes that function as feeder funds, tax benefits that rely upon status quo loopholes and referral bonuses that resemble an MLM. We believe this carries regulatory risk for every entity in the chain.

Part 2: The Relentless Self-Dealing Continues

The Premiere Group: The Holy Grail of the Schlacks Empire

The ecosystem established around OWN is just the tip of the iceberg. The entities we have highlighted thus far link back to the Schlacks’ family office – The Premiere Group (“Premiere”) – which we consider to be the hub for their relentless self-dealing.

Former employees explained to us that, for a while, the team at Premiere was indistinguishable from EQPT.

“For a long time, the Premiere guys were more or less EquipmentShare staff. I say that not in a legal or actual work duty sense, but culturally, they sat in the middle of the building and had all the same perks, everything like that. We needed to ask them a question. I would just go walk around the hall and go find them and say, hey, explain this to me. As far as how that shook out from a financial perspective, I do think it’s fair to say that there were some concerns.”

They described a pattern of Premiere plucking their most trusted employees from EQPT.

“Again, 90% of Premier’s real estate attorneys and lawyers were formerly EquipmentShare attorneys and lawyers because like I said, 90% of Premiere’s staff is former EquipmentShare. If there was someone of merit that the Schlacks trusted, they said, hey, why don’t you come over, work with us on the Premiere side instead of the EquipmentShare side?”

Premiere claims to manage more than $500 million in assets and operate in 15 industries across 50+ companies. Its website says “the original ‘Premiere’” was a general contracting business formed in the 90s, before it expanded into real estate investing in the 2000s.

Source: Premiere Group Website

We find this disclosure curious as it overlaps with the Schlacks time at Shepherdsfield when they would have been prohibited from engaging in any outside business ventures. Instead, we believe the company was established around the same time as EQPT.

Corporate records show that Premiere Group LLC was formed in Missouri by EQPT’s General Counsel John Griffin on March 23, 2016, as Schlacks Rentals LLC, just months after EQPT was founded.

Source: Missouri corporate filings

It changed its name to “Premiere Industrial Properties LLC” in October 2019, before renaming again as “The Premiere Group, LLC” in October 2022. A document from as recent as April 2026 shows Jabbok Schlacks signing on behalf of several Premiere entities, with both the brothers listed as members of The Premiere Group, LLC.

Source: Boone County Missouri

We found three primary addresses associated with The Premiere Group: (1) 1431 Cinnamon Hill Ln Columbia, MO 65201, USA – which appears to be their current HQ; (2) 8 5^th Street Fulton (aka 8 W 5th St); and (3) 221 Bolivar Street Jefferson City, MO 65101 – the address for a registered agent commonly used by the Schlacks. With these addresses, we identified 130 entities incorporated by, or associated with, Premiere or the Schlacks family.

We realize family offices often have complex corporate structures, however, certain real estate entities in The Premiere Group web piqued our interest: Premiere Industrial Properties LLC, Premiere Real Property LLC and Premiere Real Estate Holdings LLC. We believe the Schlacks have enriched themselves personally by striking self-interested real estate transactions between these entities and EQPT.

*The table below shows entities which we consider critical to the ensuing section. See Appendix for the full list of ~130 entities.

Source: Umibozu Research, Corporate Filings

Property Records Show The Premiere Group Made At Least $35 Million from Flipping EquipmentShare Properties; True Amount Extracted Likely Substantially Higher

EQPT discloses 407 operational sites, however, its location directory lists just 313 addresses. We analyzed property records for 306 of them, excluding 7 for lack of data. We categorize EQPT’s properties into three groups: (1) EQPT-purchased; (2) third-party; and (3) Premiere Group.

EQPT-purchased properties are locations EQPT has owned directly. Within this group, the Company either structured sale-leaseback arrangements or continues to own the property outright. 138 properties fall into this bucket. EQPT’s 2025 10-K shows it has recognized ~$31M over the past three years from sale-leaseback arrangements.

Source: EQPT 2025 10K (pg 109)

We found 119 locations owned by third parties rather than EQPT or Premiere. We suspect these properties feature “build-to-suit lease arrangements,” under which EQPT “is engaged by the owner to perform construction and development services prior to lease commencement.”

Source: EQPT 2025 10K pg 92

This section focuses on the final category: Premiere Group properties. These consist of 49 locations Premiere has acquired and then either flipped or continued to hold. While EQPT discloses a Master Lease Agreement with TPG Real Estate LLC, a Premiere Group subsidiary, the specific transactions involving EQPT branches appear undisclosed.

We were told the Schlacks identified real estate as key avenue for self-enrichment, instructing the team on a “playbook” to funnel profits to Premiere. We appreciate that adding branches is a natural goal for any rental company, but we believe this scheme may be a perverse incentive behind EQPT’s intense expansion of its branch count.

“You’re going to do the exact same job you did at EquipmentShare except you’re going to buy these properties on behalf of Premiere and then we’ll lease them back to EquipmentShare for profits that can then be funneled through the third-party entity at Premiere. It’s just the same playbook across a number of different verticals.”

Another former told us that team members harbored concerns about these transactions.

“I probably can’t get into specifics of things I saw that concerned me, especially when it came to leasebacks with Premiere. I had some concerns, and I know that several of my counterparts in the accounting team did as well.”

Issues related to real estate deals involving Premiere have also been alleged online.

Source: Reddit

From our analysis, we identified 32 properties Premiere acquired, held for some period of time, and then subsequently sold to third parties. The level of detail in property records varies from state to state, however, we confirmed both the purchase and the sale price for 20 of the 32 locations that were flipped. This data shows Premiere captured ~$35 million in net proceeds on these sales, a figure we see as a floor, with net proceeds for the full 32 properties likely running substantially higher.

This pattern appears to have started shortly after EQPT was founded. For example, Schlacks Rentals – the Premiere Group’s predecessor – bought a property in September 2017 and “flipped” it in 2019. Ahead of EQPT’s IPO, deal velocity began accelerating dramatically. 24 out of the 32 properties sold were divested after the start of 2025, with most sold to a single buyer: NM Equipment LP – a net lease fund run by New Mountain Capital.

The data also shows Premiere’s typical holding period is very brief, at a median of 300 days. Based on an 82% median mark-up in this period, we suspect EQPT engaged in build-to-suit arrangements with Premiere during the holding period. This would support allegations shown above regarding the purpose of these deals. A former employee described it to us as an elaborate scheme to “arbitrage” branch buildouts.

Outside of these “flips”, the Schlacks continue to own 17 properties. We found data with purchase prices for 6 of these, representing ~$16 million of real estate at EQPT locations.

One of the subset’s earliest properties – a Columbia, Missouri location – EQPT purchased, then transferred to Premiere for no consideration. In December 2025, it did the same with a California property, handing Premiere the deed to a site EQPT had bought for nearly $4.7 million roughly a year earlier.

Based on our conversations with formers, Premiere continues to hold these properties – rather than flipping them – because it is collecting highly favorable rents from EQPT.

“Imagine EquipmentShare is going to open a new branch in any town, USA. Once a specific site is identified, either EquipmentShare or Premiere will purchase it. If Premiere purchases it, typically EquipmentShare will then lease it from them. If EquipmentShare purchases it, they will sell it to a lessor. That might be Premiere, it might be a REIT and then lease it back from them. As far as Premiere goes, it is explicitly a vehicle to receive rents from EquipmentShare, and it is owned by the founder.”

We also found that several of these properties were financed under an agreement with Old National Bank. Documents reveal that on August 7, 2024, the bank executed a loan of up to $90 million to finance Premiere’s real estate portfolio. The loan is secured by mortgages on multiple Premiere-owned properties across at least a dozen states.

Source: County Documents

Why Did EquipmentShare Acquire the Schlacks “Failed” Tesla Rental Company?

In one of the more bizarre instances of self-dealing we have seen, EQPT absorbed “Resla” described as a “luxury rental company offering only high-end Teslas with cutting edge design, safety, and technology.” In our view, Resla is another example of the Schlacks using EQPT to benefit themselves as they clean up a failed personal venture.

Source: Resla Home Page

Corporate filings show Resla was formed under Premiere Industrial Properties LLC – a subsidiary of Premiere – as Premiere Luxury Car Rentals LLC in 2022. Jabbok Schlacks was listed as the “Manager”.

Source: Arizona Corporate Filings

Corporate records now show EQPT as the principal member of the entity with the business name changed to “Vehicle Solutions Group LLC”.

Source: Arizona Corporate Filings

Resla’s Co-Founder also shares that the company was “rolled into EquipmentShare” in October 2025.

Source: Landon Moore LinkedIn

Several other key employees have continued their roles at EQPT in its “Vehicle Solutions” group, including Bryson Burley – the Director of Sales for Vehicle Solutions – who concurrently lists himself as Director of Business Development at The Premiere Group.

Source: LinkedIn

Resla launched in its first city in 2023. It offers rental programs for body shops and repair facilities, corporate rentals, and a $749 per month subscription program. Resla now manages 1,137 vehicles across eight US states, having raised awareness nationwide including in Vegas.

Source: Facebook

A former insider told us that Resla was acquired to bail the Schlacks out of their investment:

“A moonshot would still be the Resla program, but that would not be an EquipmentShare moonshot. That was a Schlacks moonshot. Because it failed, EquipmentShare bought it.“

They described the mechanics of how Resla ended up on EQPT’s balance sheet:

“They just, on a whim, bought millions and millions of dollars of Teslas and said, let’s spin it up as a rental company as a side thing under The Premiere Group. That eventually got to a certain scale, but my understanding is it wasn’t sustainable or profitable. They sold it to EquipmentShare, but I don’t really have any more understanding other than that. I can tell you that it wasn’t to benefit EquipmentShare because, like anything else, EquipmentShare is there to benefit the Schlacks.“

Despite its scale, EQPT has not mentioned Resla or “Vehicle Solutions” anywhere in its investor materials. Earlier this year, a former employee posted on Glassdoor, criticizing the Schlacks for self-dealing through Resla calling it a “sinking ship” that they have deliberately avoided disclosing because it is “losing millions per year.”

Source: Glassdoor

Resla still appears to operate under EQPT today. Its careers page directs all applicants to EQPT’s hiring portal, with the tagline “Resla is proud to be part of the EquipmentShare family.” For example, during our investigation EQPT actively recruited for “Fleet Operator (Rental Car)” positions at its facilities.

We fail to see the strategic rationale for a highly levered equipment rental business absorbing and continuing to operate a Tesla loaner fleet.

Source: Instagram

Valuation: EquipmentShare Trades at a Premium to Peers Despite Weak Yields, High Leverage & No Free Cash Flow

We have seen investors argue that EQPT is cheap on an EV/OEC basis, claiming its equipment carries intrinsic value comparable to peers.

We view this as faulty. EQPT has guided for ~60% of its managed OEC to be sourced through OWN Program investors by end of 2026. Comparing 100% of its enterprise value against a fleet it retains only 40-50% of the economics on makes no sense to us. Benchmarking peers on this metric is likewise flawed: those companies generally own their assets outright, which delivers superior profitability across the rental lifecycle.

As EQPT scales OWN, EV/OEC only gets more problematic, as total OEC rises while EQPT’s share of the rental economics falls. EQPT steers investors to “Adjusted Core EBITDA”, which adds back OWN payouts and obscures the relationship between fleet growth and profitability. In 2025, these payouts were $714 million, up 70% year-over-year and larger than EQPT’s entire EBITDA before adjustments.

Source: Q1 presentation

At the midpoint, EQPT guides 2026 payouts to grow 31% against Adjusted Core EBITDA growth of just 17%. On a 2-year CAGR basis, OWN payouts are projected to grow 75% from 2024-2026, 3x the 25% growth in Adjusted Core EBITDA. This period is short, but we find it is more useful than a 3-year basis given reported OWN payouts of just $23 million in 2023.

We instead value EQPT on its two core parts: the Equipment Sales Segment and the Rental Segment. We first model the 2026 EBITDA for each.

For Equipment Sales, we take consensus equipment sales less segment cost of revenues less segment SG&A, yielding EBITDA of $238 million, ~8% above EQPT’s midpoint guidance of $221 million. We use the Street’s higher figure, which shrinks the residual ascribed to the Rental Segment to flatter EQPT.

For the Rental Segment, we begin with Adjusted Core EBITDA midpoint guidance and peel away certain add-backs: OWN payouts, Equipment Sales Segment EBITDA, and equipment/vehicle operating lease expenses. We allow new-market startup costs as an add-back, as these are real expansion investments that are declining as branch growth slows. This yields $775 million in 2026 Rental Segment EBITDA, up 19% year-over-year at a 22% margin.

As our report shows, the Equipment Sales Segment has significant channel concentration and historically the primary buyers have been HNWs and family offices purchasing for tax benefits, not equipment end users. We therefore treat it as a financing channel, not a durable sales business. Crediting it a 5x multiple implies a ~$1.2 billion valuation. That leaves ~$8.8 billion of enterprise value attributable to the Rental Segment, implying 11.6x FY26 EBITDA.

The blended valuation is 10.1x our FY26 EBITDA estimate, 11% above the peer median of 9.0x. This may not seem rich, but the premium is more notable on closer inspection. At 35% of revenue, EQPT reported 3x the Equipment Sales of peers in 2025, substantially derived from OWN, which we believe inflates its true operating EBITDA relative to peers. EQPT also sits at 4.2x net debt to EBITDA, nearly double the median. Finally, it has been the most aggressive on branch expansion. We conceded earlier that bulls have a rational argument to add startup costs back to EBITDA, but it’s worth noting that doing so expands our 2025 and 2026 EV/EBITDA premium to peers to 65% and 25%, respectively.

EQPT’s fleet yields also appear weaker. The Company does not disclose fleet productivity or utilization like peers. But comparing total rental revenue against average OEC, EQPT earns a 35% yield against a 48% peer median, trailing by 13 points. We consider this generous to EQPT: it includes ancillary revenue from parts, supplies, and services, and is measured before OWN payouts are netted out. Competitors and former employees consistently describe EQPT as leading on price to win share, though we cannot isolate price as a driver because the Company withholds time-utilization data.

Source: SEC Filings, Bloomberg

EQPT carries ~$3 billion in net debt against effectively no free cash flow. In FY25, depreciation of $365 million, a proxy for maintenance CapEx, exceeded operating cash flow of $264 million: the business does not cover even maintenance before any growth spending. We expect CapEx to rise as the fleet ages into heavier maintenance, making this a conservative proxy.

On these fundamentals, and the governance and disclosure failures detailed in our report, we believe EQPT should trade at a discount to peers, not a premium, implying substantial downside.

Conclusion

Underneath EQPT’s “tech-powered” story, we found self-interested leadership that has used obfuscation to extract as much as possible at the expense of shareholders.

We believe the Schlacks have filled key roles with family and former members of Shepherdsfield to insulate their self-dealing, while silencing critics through retaliatory actions. Throughout our investigation we found that employees were unable or unwilling to speak to us, while those we did speak to treaded carefully with responses due to fears of backlash.

We believe the market has mistaken a related-party financing machine for a capital-light industry disruptor. Strip out the OWN Program adjustments and the undisclosed entities that feed it, and EQPT is a capital-intensive rental business with weak yields, high leverage, and no free cash flow trading at a premium to peers. As the lock-up expires and the OWN narrative meets institutional scrutiny, we expect this gap to close.

We are short EquipmentShare.

Appendix

The Premiere Group/Schlacks Entity List